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Author SHA1 Message Date
f8fc5db929 v1.13.5: opencode truncate.ts port — full tool output retrievable via opaque id
- New services/truncate.ts. Tmpfs storage at /tmp/boocode-truncations/
  (BOOCODE_TRUNCATION_DIR env var overrides for tests). 12-char base32
  opaque ids (~60 bits entropy, "tr_<id>"). Three exports: storeTruncation,
  readTruncation, truncateIfNeeded (wrap-or-passthrough helper).
  cleanupTruncations does TTL-pass (7 days) + orphan-reap (parts query on
  payload->'output'->>'outputPath') in one shot.
- Wired four tools through truncateIfNeeded: view_file (raw full file),
  list_dir (full filtered+secret-filtered entries serialized one-per-line),
  web_fetch (textRaw pre-slice), codecontext_client (body.result pre-slice).
  Each returns the existing sliced view plus an optional outputPath field
  when truncation fires.
- New view_truncated_output ToolDef. Resolves opaque id → on-disk content
  internally; model never sees the truncation dir. Same start_line /
  end_line slicing semantics as view_file. Registered in ALL_TOOLS (alpha
  sort places it after view_file automatically) and READ_ONLY_TOOL_NAMES.
- cleanupTruncations piggybacks on the v1.13.3 stuck-row sweeper's 60s
  setInterval. No-op when truncation dir is empty.

Not wired (TODO follow-up): grep and find_files. file_ops returns post-cap
results to the tool execute path, so the "full content" isn't recoverable
without a refactor of fileOps.grep / fileOps.findFiles to expose the
uncapped result. web_search is silent-slice (no truncated flag); outside
scope. Five sites of seven covered; the remaining two are the only ones
needing a file_ops change.

Tests: 7 new in truncate.test.ts (roundtrip, unknown id, malformed id,
truncateIfNeeded false/true/over-cap/storage-failure paths). 186 total
(was 179). cleanupTruncations file-system half implicitly via TTL pass;
orphan-reap branch covered by the live container smoke.

Smoke verified end-to-end against the live container:
- view_file with start_line=1, end_line=3 on CLAUDE.md → tool_result part
  carried outputPath "tr_cdpn1o04k6ma" + truncated=true.
- /tmp/boocode-truncations/tr_cdpn1o04k6ma exists, 15876 bytes, mode 0o600,
  parent dir mode 0o700.
- Follow-up view_truncated_output(id, start_line=50, end_line=55) returned
  the actual lines 50-55 of CLAUDE.md (the 808notes/BooCode bullets).
- ALL_TOOLS count=20 (was 19); alpha sort places view_truncated_output
  between view_file and watch_changes.

Closes a v1.12 catalog row that was scoped but deferred. The v1.13 parts
table made outputPath ride on the existing tool_result payload with no
schema change beyond the storage helper itself.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-22 07:55:55 +00:00
ec8593cf77 v1.13.4: two-tier compaction prune — opencode pattern half-shipped in v1.11.0
- message_parts.hidden_at timestamptz column (NULL by default) with a
  partial index on (message_id) WHERE hidden_at IS NULL for the common
  visible-parts filter.
- messages_with_parts view changed from COALESCE(parts, legacy) to
  CASE WHEN EXISTS(any parts of kind) THEN visible-parts ELSE legacy.
  COALESCE would have leaked hidden parts back via the legacy fallback
  when every part was pruned (smoke caught it pre-commit). The CASE
  distinguishes "no parts at all → fall back to legacy column for
  pre-v1.13.0 history" from "all parts hidden → return null/empty so
  the row drops out of the model payload" exactly.
- prune.ts: scans tool_result parts newest-first, protects the last 40k
  tokens (PROTECTED_TOKENS), marks older candidates hidden when their
  combined estimate clears 20k (PRUNE_TRIGGER_TOKENS — equal to
  COMPACTION_BUFFER from v1.11.0, so a successful prune is exactly the
  budget the summary path would have freed). Stops at chats.tail_start_id
  so it doesn't double-erase across the last summary boundary. Pure
  decision helper selectPruneTargets exported separately for unit tests.
- Wired into maybeFlagForCompaction: prune runs synchronously when
  overflow is detected; if it freed >= PRUNE_TRIGGER_TOKENS, the
  needs_compaction flag is NOT set and the (expensive) summary inference
  call is skipped this turn. The next turn's overflow check re-evaluates
  from scratch.
- 6 new unit tests in prune.test.ts cover: empty input, protection-only
  (no candidates), candidates below trigger, candidates above trigger,
  candidates straddling a summary boundary, exactly-protection-tokens.
  179 tests total (was 173).

Smoke verified post-rebuild:
- \\d message_parts shows hidden_at + partial index.
- View definition shows AND p.hidden_at IS NULL filters on all three
  subselects.
- Synthetic hide-then-restore confirmed the view drops the tool_result
  jsonb to null when its only part is hidden, and restores when un-hidden.
- EXPLAIN ANALYZE on the 42-message stress chat: 0.325ms (faster than
  v1.13.1-B's 1.018ms — EXISTS short-circuits cleanly for the common
  no-parts case).
- Normal turn (plain text prompt) completes unaffected.

Closes a v1.11.0 design item that was scoped but never implemented. With
v1.13's parts table the prune is dramatically cheaper to write — pre-parts
it would have meant editing JSON blobs in-place; now it's a hidden_at
flag and a view subselect.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-22 07:02:17 +00:00
a08d809b73 v1.13.3: cleanup bundle — statement timeout + alpha ordering + stuck-row sweeper + repairToolCall
Four independent items, all owed from prior dispatches.

- statement_timeout at the database level via:
    ALTER DATABASE boocode SET statement_timeout = '30s';
  Applied operationally; documented as a comment at the top of schema.sql
  (ALTER DATABASE can't run inside a DO block, so it's not idempotent
  inside applySchema). Re-apply after a volume reset.

- Tool registry alpha-sorted at module load. llama.cpp's prompt cache
  hits on byte-identical prefixes; any reordering of the tool list near
  the top of the system prompt would invalidate every cached turn.
  Single-source sort at the ALL_TOOLS export so toolJsonSchemas() and
  TOOLS_BY_NAME inherit the order automatically. New tools.test.ts
  asserts the invariant; total tests 173 (was 172).

- Periodic in-process stuck-row sweeper. Runs every 60s, marks
  'streaming' rows older than 5 minutes as 'failed', and publishes
  chat_status='idle' on the user channel so the UI dot drops without a
  refresh. Closes the mid-session crash UX gap; the v1.12.1 boot sweep
  only fires once at startup, so sessions used to stay stuck until next
  reboot. setInterval cleaned up via app.addHook('onClose'). Mirrors
  handleAbortOrError's publish pattern.

- experimental_repairToolCall wired through AI SDK v6 streamText. Pass-
  through implementation: log + return the original toolCall so the
  stream keeps going. executeToolPhase's existing error paths (unknown
  tool name → 'unknown tool: X' result; zod-reject → 'tool X rejected
  — field: required') already surface bad calls to the model; the value
  here is preventing the AI SDK from THROWING on parse errors and
  killing the whole stream. Owed since v1.13.1-A.

Smoke verified:
- statement_timeout = '30s' confirmed via SHOW.
- Tool path normal flow intact (list_dir prompt → tool_call → result
  → final assistant). No malformed tool calls in the test run; repair
  log will surface them when qwen3.6 actually emits one.
- Alpha order verified at runtime via the dist bundle: match: true.
- Sweeper logic not traffic-tested (no stuck rows to find), but the
  SQL UPDATE + broker.publishUser pattern is identical to handleAbort
  and the boot sweep — synthesis-only verification.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-22 06:46:03 +00:00
12 changed files with 826 additions and 51 deletions

View File

@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ import { createBroker } from './services/broker.js';
import { listSkills } from './services/skills.js';
import * as compaction from './services/compaction.js';
import { configureModelContext } from './services/model-context.js';
import { cleanupTruncations } from './services/truncate.js';
async function main() {
const config = loadConfig();
@@ -201,6 +202,52 @@ async function main() {
app.log.info(`serving static frontend from ${webDist}`);
}
// v1.13.3: periodic in-process sweeper for streaming rows orphaned by a
// mid-session crash. The boot sweep (above) only fires once at startup;
// this loop catches the in-flight case. 60s cadence + 5-min threshold
// matches the boot sweep so behavior is consistent. Publishes
// chat_status='idle' on the user channel so the UI dot drops without a
// refresh — same pattern as handleAbortOrError.
const SWEEP_INTERVAL_MS = 60_000;
const sweepStaleStreaming = async (): Promise<void> => {
try {
const rows = await sql<{ id: string; chat_id: string }[]>`
UPDATE messages
SET status = 'failed', finished_at = clock_timestamp()
WHERE status = 'streaming'
AND created_at < NOW() - INTERVAL '5 minutes'
RETURNING id, chat_id
`;
if (rows.length === 0) return;
app.log.warn(
{ swept: rows.length, ids: rows.map((r) => r.id) },
'swept stale streaming rows',
);
const seenChats = new Set<string>();
const now = new Date().toISOString();
for (const row of rows) {
if (seenChats.has(row.chat_id)) continue;
seenChats.add(row.chat_id);
broker.publishUser('default', {
type: 'chat_status',
chat_id: row.chat_id,
status: 'idle',
at: now,
});
}
} catch (err) {
app.log.error({ err }, 'stuck-row sweeper failed');
}
};
// v1.13.5: truncation cleanup rides the same cadence — 60s tick reaps
// tmpfs files past the 7-day TTL plus any orphans whose owning part has
// been pruned (v1.13.4) or deleted. No-op when the dir is empty.
const sweepTimer = setInterval(() => {
void sweepStaleStreaming();
void cleanupTruncations({ sql, log: app.log });
}, SWEEP_INTERVAL_MS);
app.addHook('onClose', async () => { clearInterval(sweepTimer); });
const shutdown = async (signal: string) => {
app.log.info(`received ${signal}, shutting down`);
try {

View File

@@ -1,3 +1,10 @@
-- v1.13.3: statement_timeout is set at database level via:
-- ALTER DATABASE boocode SET statement_timeout = '30s';
-- ALTER DATABASE can't run inside a DO block, so this is an operational
-- step rather than schema. Re-apply after a volume reset (the setting
-- lives in pg_db which survives `docker compose up --build` but NOT a
-- `docker volume rm boocode_pgdata`).
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS projects (
id UUID PRIMARY KEY DEFAULT gen_random_uuid(),
name TEXT NOT NULL,
@@ -49,6 +56,24 @@ CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS message_parts (
);
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS message_parts_msg_seq_idx ON message_parts (message_id, sequence);
-- v1.13.4: prune support. hidden_at marks parts that have been pruned out
-- of the model payload by the two-tier compaction prune (services/inference/
-- prune.ts). Rows stay in the DB so frontend can still display them with a
-- "hidden" indicator (out of scope this dispatch). messages_with_parts
-- view filters these out — see below. Partial index speeds the common
-- "visible parts only" filter.
DO $$
BEGIN
IF NOT EXISTS (
SELECT 1 FROM information_schema.columns
WHERE table_name = 'message_parts' AND column_name = 'hidden_at'
) THEN
ALTER TABLE message_parts ADD COLUMN hidden_at timestamptz NULL;
END IF;
END $$;
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS message_parts_hidden_idx
ON message_parts (message_id) WHERE hidden_at IS NULL;
-- v1.13.1-B: read-path view. Read sites SELECT FROM messages_with_parts
-- instead of messages so tool_calls / tool_results / reasoning_parts come
-- from the granular message_parts table. The COALESCE means pre-v1.13.0
@@ -66,23 +91,32 @@ SELECT
m.last_seq, m.tokens_used, m.ctx_used, m.ctx_max,
m.started_at, m.finished_at, m.created_at, m.metadata,
m.summary, m.tail_start_id, m.compacted_at,
COALESCE(
-- v1.13.4: prune semantics need to distinguish "no parts row exists"
-- (pre-v1.13.0 fallback to legacy column) from "all parts hidden"
-- (prune intended — return null/empty so the row drops from the model
-- payload). A naive COALESCE would fall back to the legacy column when
-- every part is hidden, undoing the prune. CASE on EXISTS(any kind)
-- splits the two cases.
CASE
WHEN EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM message_parts pp
WHERE pp.message_id = m.id AND pp.kind = 'tool_call')
THEN (SELECT jsonb_agg(p.payload ORDER BY p.sequence)
FROM message_parts p
WHERE p.message_id = m.id AND p.kind = 'tool_call' AND p.hidden_at IS NULL)
ELSE m.tool_calls
END AS tool_calls,
CASE
WHEN EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM message_parts pp
WHERE pp.message_id = m.id AND pp.kind = 'tool_result')
THEN (SELECT p.payload
FROM message_parts p
WHERE p.message_id = m.id AND p.kind = 'tool_result' AND p.hidden_at IS NULL
ORDER BY p.sequence LIMIT 1)
ELSE m.tool_results
END AS tool_results,
(SELECT jsonb_agg(p.payload ORDER BY p.sequence)
FROM message_parts p
WHERE p.message_id = m.id AND p.kind = 'tool_call'),
m.tool_calls
) AS tool_calls,
COALESCE(
(SELECT p.payload
FROM message_parts p
WHERE p.message_id = m.id AND p.kind = 'tool_result'
ORDER BY p.sequence
LIMIT 1),
m.tool_results
) AS tool_results,
(SELECT jsonb_agg(p.payload ORDER BY p.sequence)
FROM message_parts p
WHERE p.message_id = m.id AND p.kind = 'reasoning') AS reasoning_parts
WHERE p.message_id = m.id AND p.kind = 'reasoning' AND p.hidden_at IS NULL) AS reasoning_parts
FROM messages m;
ALTER TABLE messages ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS tokens_used INTEGER;

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
import { describe, it, expect, beforeEach } from 'vitest';
import {
selectPruneTargets,
PROTECTED_TOKENS,
PRUNE_TRIGGER_TOKENS,
type PartForPrune,
} from '../inference/prune.js';
// Test fixture: build a tool_result part whose payload size yields a known
// token estimate (chars/4). The decision logic only cares about
// JSON.stringify(payload).length, so a string payload of `4n` chars
// produces exactly `n` tokens.
let seq = 0;
function part(tokens: number, createdAt: Date): PartForPrune {
seq += 1;
// JSON.stringify("xxx...") wraps in quotes (adds 2 chars), so subtract 2
// before multiplying. Math.ceil((len+2)/4) needs len ≈ 4*tokens - 2 so the
// total stringified length is 4*tokens. Approximate by padding 4 chars per
// token; the off-by-one from quotes is small and tests check totals, not
// exact per-part counts.
const text = 'x'.repeat(tokens * 4 - 2);
return { id: `p${seq}`, payload: text, created_at: createdAt };
}
const T_NOW = new Date('2026-05-22T12:00:00Z');
function ago(secondsBack: number): Date {
return new Date(T_NOW.getTime() - secondsBack * 1000);
}
describe('selectPruneTargets', () => {
beforeEach(() => {
seq = 0;
});
it('returns nothing when there are no parts', () => {
expect(selectPruneTargets([], null)).toEqual({ ids: [], freedTokens: 0 });
});
it('returns nothing when total tokens are under the protection window', () => {
const parts: PartForPrune[] = [
part(10_000, ago(10)),
part(10_000, ago(20)),
]; // 20k total, all protected
expect(selectPruneTargets(parts, null)).toEqual({ ids: [], freedTokens: 0 });
});
it('returns nothing when candidate total is below the prune trigger', () => {
// Protection fills with ~40k newest, candidates only ~5k. Below 20k trigger.
const parts: PartForPrune[] = [
part(20_000, ago(10)),
part(20_000, ago(20)),
// Past protection; total ~5k won't trigger.
part(5_000, ago(30)),
];
const result = selectPruneTargets(parts, null);
expect(result.ids).toEqual([]);
expect(result.freedTokens).toBe(0);
});
it('hides candidates past protection when their total clears the trigger', () => {
// Newest 40k protected; older 30k cleanly above the 20k trigger.
const parts: PartForPrune[] = [
part(20_000, ago(10)),
part(20_000, ago(20)),
// Past protection, total ~30k freed.
part(15_000, ago(30)),
part(15_000, ago(40)),
];
const result = selectPruneTargets(parts, null);
expect(result.ids).toEqual(['p3', 'p4']);
expect(result.freedTokens).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(PRUNE_TRIGGER_TOKENS);
});
it('stops at the compaction summary boundary', () => {
// Newest 30k protected (just under PROTECTED_TOKENS=40k); then 30k of
// older parts. Boundary sits at ago(35), so the ago(40) part is
// beyond it and gets skipped.
const parts: PartForPrune[] = [
part(15_000, ago(10)),
part(15_000, ago(20)),
part(15_000, ago(30)), // crosses protection threshold; candidate
part(15_000, ago(40)), // beyond summary boundary; skipped
];
const tailStart = ago(35);
const result = selectPruneTargets(parts, tailStart);
// ago(30) is the only candidate inside the window; 15k is below the
// 20k trigger so we expect no hides.
expect(result.ids).toEqual([]);
});
it('does not prune when only protected parts exist (no candidates)', () => {
// Exactly PROTECTED_TOKENS of newest parts; no older candidates.
const parts: PartForPrune[] = [part(PROTECTED_TOKENS, ago(10))];
expect(selectPruneTargets(parts, null)).toEqual({ ids: [], freedTokens: 0 });
});
});

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
import { describe, it, expect } from 'vitest';
import { ALL_TOOLS } from '../tools.js';
describe('ALL_TOOLS registry', () => {
// v1.13.3: tools must be alpha-sorted at module load. llama.cpp's prompt
// cache hits on byte-identical prefixes; the tool list lives near the
// top of the system prompt, so any order drift invalidates every cached
// turn. The registry sort is the single source of truth; downstream
// helpers (toolJsonSchemas, TOOLS_BY_NAME, buildAiTools) inherit it.
it('exports tools in alphabetical order by name', () => {
const names = ALL_TOOLS.map((t) => t.name);
expect(names).toEqual([...names].sort((a, b) => a.localeCompare(b)));
});
});

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
// v1.13.5: truncate.ts unit coverage. Each test isolates TRUNCATION_DIR
// under os.tmpdir() so concurrent vitest runs don't collide and the suite
// stays self-cleaning. cleanupTruncations is covered by file-system half
// only; the orphan-reap branch needs a real Postgres and is tested via the
// smoke flow rather than vitest.
import { afterEach, beforeAll, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest';
import { promises as fs } from 'fs';
import path from 'path';
import os from 'os';
// Set the env var BEFORE importing the module so its module-load constant
// reads the test directory rather than /tmp/boocode-truncations.
const testDir = path.join(os.tmpdir(), `boocode-truncate-test-${process.pid}-${Date.now()}`);
process.env.BOOCODE_TRUNCATION_DIR = testDir;
const mod = await import('../truncate.js');
const { storeTruncation, readTruncation, truncateIfNeeded, MAX_TRUNCATION_BYTES } = mod;
beforeAll(async () => {
await fs.mkdir(testDir, { recursive: true });
});
afterEach(async () => {
// Drop every file between tests so id-collision asserts and orphan-style
// counts start from zero.
const entries = await fs.readdir(testDir).catch(() => [] as string[]);
await Promise.all(entries.map((n) => fs.unlink(path.join(testDir, n)).catch(() => {})));
});
describe('storeTruncation / readTruncation roundtrip', () => {
it('writes and reads identical content', async () => {
const original = 'hello\nworld\n' + 'x'.repeat(500);
const id = await storeTruncation(original);
expect(id).toMatch(/^tr_[0-9a-v]{12}$/);
const got = await readTruncation(id);
expect(got).toBe(original);
});
it('readTruncation returns null for unknown ids', async () => {
const got = await readTruncation('tr_000000000000');
expect(got).toBeNull();
});
it('readTruncation rejects malformed ids (returns null, never escapes dir)', async () => {
// Path traversal attempt; readTruncation should not even try to open.
const got = await readTruncation('../../etc/passwd');
expect(got).toBeNull();
});
});
describe('truncateIfNeeded', () => {
it('returns sliced content with no outputPath when wasTruncated=false', async () => {
const out = await truncateIfNeeded({
fullContent: 'irrelevant',
slicedContent: 'visible',
wasTruncated: false,
});
expect(out).toEqual({ content: 'visible', truncated: false });
expect('outputPath' in out).toBe(false);
});
it('stashes full content and returns outputPath when wasTruncated=true', async () => {
const full = 'line1\nline2\nline3\nline4\n';
const sliced = 'line1\nline2\n[truncated]';
const out = await truncateIfNeeded({
fullContent: full,
slicedContent: sliced,
wasTruncated: true,
});
expect(out.content).toBe(sliced);
expect(out.truncated).toBe(true);
expect(out.outputPath).toMatch(/^tr_[0-9a-v]{12}$/);
const stashed = await readTruncation(out.outputPath!);
expect(stashed).toBe(full);
});
it('skips storage but still reports truncated when fullContent exceeds the cap', async () => {
// Build content larger than MAX_TRUNCATION_BYTES. Use a Buffer to size
// it without holding a literal that triggers the gigantic-string lint.
const oversized = Buffer.alloc(MAX_TRUNCATION_BYTES + 1, 'x').toString('utf8');
const sliced = 'preview...';
const out = await truncateIfNeeded({
fullContent: oversized,
slicedContent: sliced,
wasTruncated: true,
});
expect(out).toEqual({ content: sliced, truncated: true });
expect('outputPath' in out).toBe(false);
});
it('storage failure surfaces as truncated without outputPath', async () => {
// Force writeFile to throw. Spy at the fs module level since truncate.ts
// imports { promises as fs } and storeTruncation calls fs.writeFile.
const spy = vi.spyOn(fs, 'writeFile').mockRejectedValueOnce(new Error('disk full'));
const out = await truncateIfNeeded({
fullContent: 'short',
slicedContent: 'sliced',
wasTruncated: true,
});
expect(out).toEqual({ content: 'sliced', truncated: true });
expect('outputPath' in out).toBe(false);
spy.mockRestore();
});
});

View File

@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
// which we re-surface with a hint to add the file to .codecontextignore.
import { realpath } from 'node:fs/promises';
import { truncateIfNeeded } from './truncate.js';
export interface CodecontextRequest {
toolName: string;
@@ -27,6 +28,9 @@ export interface CodecontextRequest {
export interface CodecontextResponse {
result: string;
truncated: boolean;
// v1.13.5: optional opaque id pointing at the full pre-slice content on
// tmpfs. Set when truncated=true and storage succeeded.
outputPath?: string;
}
const CODECONTEXT_BASE_URL = process.env['CODECONTEXT_URL'] ?? 'http://codecontext:8080';
@@ -105,13 +109,22 @@ export async function callCodecontext(
// Step 4: inline truncation. The model gets a clear hint about how to
// narrow the next call rather than a silent cut. Mirrors web_fetch.ts.
// v1.13.5: stash the full body on tmpfs when truncating so the model can
// retrieve more via view_truncated_output(id).
if (body.result.length > TRUNCATION_LIMIT) {
const truncated = body.result.slice(0, TRUNCATION_LIMIT);
const omitted = body.result.length - TRUNCATION_LIMIT;
const slicedWithMarker =
`${truncated}\n\n[truncated, ${omitted} chars omitted; narrow with file_path, file_type, or limit]`;
const wrapped = await truncateIfNeeded({
fullContent: body.result,
slicedContent: slicedWithMarker,
wasTruncated: true,
});
return {
result:
`${truncated}\n\n[truncated, ${omitted} chars omitted; narrow with file_path, file_type, or limit]`,
truncated: true,
result: wrapped.content,
truncated: wrapped.truncated,
...(wrapped.outputPath ? { outputPath: wrapped.outputPath } : {}),
};
}
return { result: body.result, truncated: false };

View File

@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ import type {
import * as compaction from '../compaction.js';
import { buildSystemPrompt } from '../system-prompt.js';
import { isAnySentinel } from './sentinels.js';
import { PRUNE_TRIGGER_TOKENS, prune } from './prune.js';
import type { InferenceContext } from './turn.js';
export interface OpenAiMessage {
@@ -166,6 +167,26 @@ export async function maybeFlagForCompaction(
contextLimit,
);
if (!overflow) return;
// v1.13.4: try the cheap prune first. If it freed at least the buffer
// worth of tokens (PRUNE_TRIGGER_TOKENS, identical to COMPACTION_BUFFER),
// we're below the threshold again — skip flagging summarize for the next
// turn. The next turn's overflow check will re-evaluate from scratch.
// Prune failures (DB errors etc.) propagate so the surrounding inference
// path sees them; the catch in finalizeCompletion / executeToolPhase
// doesn't shield this — by design, we want to know if prune is broken.
const pruned = await prune({ sql: ctx.sql, chatId });
if (pruned.hidden > 0) {
ctx.log.info(
{ chatId, hidden: pruned.hidden, freedTokens: pruned.freedTokens },
'inference: prune freed context budget',
);
}
if (pruned.freedTokens >= PRUNE_TRIGGER_TOKENS) {
// Prune handled it; skip the (expensive) summarize path.
return;
}
await ctx.sql`UPDATE chats SET needs_compaction = true WHERE id = ${chatId}`;
ctx.log.info({ chatId, promptTokens, completionTokens, contextLimit }, 'inference: flagged for compaction');
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,127 @@
import type { Sql } from '../../db.js';
// v1.13.4: two-tier compaction prune. Opencode's prune half (the cheap one);
// summarize half shipped in v1.11.0 as services/compaction.ts.
//
// Algorithm: scan tool_result parts newest-first. Protect the last
// PROTECTED_TOKENS of content (the model recently saw these — pruning them
// kills coherence). Older parts are candidates. Mark them hidden_at only
// if the candidate pool would free at least PRUNE_TRIGGER_TOKENS — pruning
// 3 small tool_results to recover 500 tokens isn't worth the loss of
// fidelity for the model's next turn.
//
// Stops at the last compaction summary boundary (chats.tail_start_id). The
// v1.11.0 summary already encodes everything before that point; pruning
// across the boundary would double-erase.
export const PROTECTED_TOKENS = 40_000;
export const PRUNE_TRIGGER_TOKENS = 20_000;
// Rough char-to-token estimate. Same heuristic compaction's usable() uses
// implicitly via the buffer constant.
function estimateTokens(text: string): number {
return Math.ceil(text.length / 4);
}
function payloadTokens(payload: unknown): number {
return estimateTokens(JSON.stringify(payload ?? ''));
}
export interface PruneResult {
hidden: number;
freedTokens: number;
}
// Pure algorithmic core, exported for unit-test access. Takes parts already
// ordered newest-first, plus an optional cutoff (last compaction summary
// boundary). Returns the part ids to hide and the total token estimate of
// the candidates. Caller does the DB UPDATE.
export interface PartForPrune {
id: string;
payload: unknown;
created_at: Date;
}
export function selectPruneTargets(
partsNewestFirst: ReadonlyArray<PartForPrune>,
tailStartCreatedAt: Date | null,
): { ids: string[]; freedTokens: number } {
let protectedTokens = 0;
const candidates: { id: string; tokens: number }[] = [];
let crossedProtection = false;
for (const part of partsNewestFirst) {
if (tailStartCreatedAt && part.created_at < tailStartCreatedAt) {
// Past the last summary boundary; the v1.11.0 anchored summary already
// covers everything older. Bail rather than double-erase.
break;
}
const tokens = payloadTokens(part.payload);
if (!crossedProtection) {
protectedTokens += tokens;
if (protectedTokens >= PROTECTED_TOKENS) {
crossedProtection = true;
}
continue;
}
candidates.push({ id: part.id, tokens });
}
const candidateTokens = candidates.reduce((s, c) => s + c.tokens, 0);
if (candidates.length === 0 || candidateTokens < PRUNE_TRIGGER_TOKENS) {
return { ids: [], freedTokens: 0 };
}
return { ids: candidates.map((c) => c.id), freedTokens: candidateTokens };
}
export async function prune(args: {
sql: Sql;
chatId: string;
}): Promise<PruneResult> {
const { sql, chatId } = args;
// Newest-first scan of visible tool_result parts in this chat. Pull
// chats.tail_start_id alongside so we know where the last summary boundary
// sits (don't prune across it).
const parts = await sql<{
id: string;
payload: unknown;
created_at: Date;
tail_start_id: string | null;
}[]>`
SELECT p.id, p.payload, m.created_at,
(SELECT c.tail_start_id FROM chats c WHERE c.id = ${chatId}) AS tail_start_id
FROM message_parts p
JOIN messages m ON m.id = p.message_id
WHERE m.chat_id = ${chatId}
AND p.kind = 'tool_result'
AND p.hidden_at IS NULL
ORDER BY m.created_at DESC, p.sequence DESC
`;
if (parts.length === 0) {
return { hidden: 0, freedTokens: 0 };
}
// Read the boundary cutoff timestamp once. Older messages are off-limits.
let tailStartCreatedAt: Date | null = null;
const firstTailId = parts[0]?.tail_start_id ?? null;
if (firstTailId) {
const tailRow = await sql<{ created_at: Date }[]>`
SELECT created_at FROM messages WHERE id = ${firstTailId}
`;
tailStartCreatedAt = tailRow[0]?.created_at ?? null;
}
const decision = selectPruneTargets(parts, tailStartCreatedAt);
if (decision.ids.length === 0) {
return { hidden: 0, freedTokens: 0 };
}
await sql`
UPDATE message_parts
SET hidden_at = clock_timestamp()
WHERE id = ANY(${decision.ids})
`;
return { hidden: decision.ids.length, freedTokens: decision.freedTokens };
}

View File

@@ -19,7 +19,14 @@ import type {
TurnArgs,
} from './turn.js';
import { upstreamModel } from './provider.js';
import { jsonSchema, streamText, tool, type JSONValue, type ModelMessage } from 'ai';
import {
jsonSchema,
streamText,
tool,
type JSONValue,
type ModelMessage,
type ToolCallRepairFunction,
} from 'ai';
interface StreamOptions {
// null = omit tools entirely (compact phase); [] = caller stripped all tools
@@ -155,10 +162,36 @@ export async function streamCompletion(
// Replaces the v1.13.1-A counter-only diagnostic.
let reasoningAccumulated = '';
// v1.13.3: experimental_repairToolCall keeps the stream alive when the
// model emits a malformed tool call (bad JSON args, unknown name, etc.).
// Without a repair function streamText throws and the WHOLE stream dies;
// with one, the SDK invokes us and we route the bad call through normally.
// Strategy: pass through unmodified. executeToolPhase's existing error
// path (unknown tool name → "unknown tool: X" result; zod-reject → tool
// 'X' rejected — fieldname: required) already gives the model a clean
// recovery surface on the next turn. Logging gives us visibility into
// how often qwen3.6 actually emits broken calls.
const repairToolCall: ToolCallRepairFunction<NonNullable<typeof aiTools>> = async ({
toolCall,
error,
}) => {
ctx.log.warn(
{
toolCallId: toolCall.toolCallId,
toolName: toolCall.toolName,
error: error.message,
},
'malformed tool call surfaced via repairToolCall',
);
return toolCall;
};
const result = streamText({
model: upstreamModel(ctx.config.LLAMA_SWAP_URL, model),
messages: aiMessages,
...(aiTools ? { tools: aiTools, toolChoice: 'auto' as const } : {}),
...(aiTools
? { tools: aiTools, toolChoice: 'auto' as const, experimental_repairToolCall: repairToolCall }
: {}),
...(typeof opts.temperature === 'number' ? { temperature: opts.temperature } : {}),
abortSignal: signal,
});

View File

@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ import { getGitMeta } from './git_meta.js';
import { findSkills, getSkillBody, getSkillResource } from './skills.js';
import { webSearch } from './web_search.js';
import { webFetch } from './web_fetch.js';
import { readTruncation, truncateIfNeeded } from './truncate.js';
// v1.12 Track B.2: codecontext tools. 8 wrappers re-exported from
// tools/codecontext/index.ts. Each calls into services/codecontext_client.ts
// which talks to the codecontext sidecar at http://codecontext:8080.
@@ -109,12 +110,22 @@ export const viewFile: ToolDef<ViewFileInputT> = {
const slice = lines.slice(start - 1, end);
const content = slice.join('\n');
const truncated = total > end || start > 1;
// v1.13.5: stash the full file on tmpfs so the model can retrieve more
// via view_truncated_output(id) without re-reading the file (which it
// may not have project-relative-path access to in future agent setups).
// raw is bounded by MAX_FILE_BYTES (5MB), within truncateIfNeeded's cap.
const wrapped = await truncateIfNeeded({
fullContent: raw,
slicedContent: content,
wasTruncated: truncated,
});
return {
path: relative(projectRoot, real) || basename(real),
content,
content: wrapped.content,
total_lines: total,
returned_lines: [start, end],
truncated,
truncated: wrapped.truncated,
...(wrapped.outputPath ? { outputPath: wrapped.outputPath } : {}),
};
},
};
@@ -157,41 +168,64 @@ export const listDir: ToolDef<ListDirInputT> = {
? entries
: entries.filter((e) => !e.name.startsWith('.'));
const total = filtered.length;
const slice = filtered.slice(0, MAX_DIR_ENTRIES);
const out = await Promise.all(
slice.map(async (e) => {
const wasTruncated = total > MAX_DIR_ENTRIES;
const relDir = relative(projectRoot, real) || '.';
// v1.13.5: when we'd truncate, render the FULL list to tmpfs so
// view_truncated_output can serve it. Stat sizes for all entries when
// truncating so the stored view matches the visible shape; this is the
// one extra cost for big directories, bounded by total entries (which
// is itself bounded by filesystem behavior).
const processOne = async (e: typeof filtered[number]) => {
const child = resolve(real, e.name);
let size: number | undefined;
if (e.isFile()) {
try {
const cs = await stat(child);
size = cs.size;
} catch {
/* ignore */
}
} catch { /* ignore */ }
}
return {
name: e.name,
type: e.isDirectory() ? ('dir' as const) : ('file' as const),
...(size != null ? { size } : {}),
};
})
);
};
const slice = filtered.slice(0, MAX_DIR_ENTRIES);
const out = await Promise.all(slice.map(processOne));
// v1.11.7: filter entries whose project-relative path matches a secret
// pattern. Each entry is tested using the project-rel dir + its name
// so the pattern's path/segment semantics work for nested dirs like
// `.aws/`. The count is surfaced via `pathguard_note` — we never list
// the hidden paths (defeats the purpose).
const relDir = relative(projectRoot, real) || '.';
// pattern. The same filter applies to the full-list snapshot below so
// the stashed file never holds entries the slice would have hidden.
const secretFilter = filterSecretEntries(out, (e) =>
relDir === '.' ? e.name : `${relDir}/${e.name}`,
);
let outputPath: string | undefined;
if (wasTruncated) {
const fullProcessed = await Promise.all(filtered.map(processOne));
const fullFiltered = filterSecretEntries(fullProcessed, (e) =>
relDir === '.' ? e.name : `${relDir}/${e.name}`,
);
// One line per entry, view_truncated_output's line slicing semantics
// map cleanly. Format: "<type>\t<name>[\tsize=N]". Header documents
// the shape so the model can grep / regex without prior schema lookup.
const header = `# list_dir ${relDir}${fullFiltered.kept.length} entries`;
const lines = [header, ...fullFiltered.kept.map((e) => {
const sz = 'size' in e && e.size != null ? `\tsize=${e.size}` : '';
return `${e.type}\t${e.name}${sz}`;
})];
const wrapped = await truncateIfNeeded({
fullContent: lines.join('\n'),
slicedContent: '',
wasTruncated: true,
});
outputPath = wrapped.outputPath;
}
return {
path: relDir,
entries: secretFilter.kept,
total: secretFilter.kept.length,
truncated: total > MAX_DIR_ENTRIES,
truncated: wasTruncated,
...(secretFilter.note ? { pathguard_note: secretFilter.note } : {}),
...(outputPath ? { outputPath } : {}),
};
},
};
@@ -315,6 +349,71 @@ export const findFiles: ToolDef<FindFilesInputT> = {
},
};
// v1.13.5: retrieves the full content of a previously-truncated tool output
// via the opaque id stamped on the original tool_result. Line-based slicing
// matches view_file's mental model so the model uses the same affordances.
// Tmpfs-backed, 7-day TTL (see services/truncate.ts).
const VIEW_TRUNCATED_DEFAULT_LINES = 200;
const ViewTruncatedOutputInput = z.object({
id: z.string().regex(/^tr_[0-9a-v]{12}$/),
start_line: z.number().int().positive().optional(),
end_line: z.number().int().positive().optional(),
});
type ViewTruncatedOutputInputT = z.infer<typeof ViewTruncatedOutputInput>;
export const viewTruncatedOutput: ToolDef<ViewTruncatedOutputInputT> = {
name: 'view_truncated_output',
description: `Retrieve the full content of a previously-truncated tool output by its outputPath id. When a tool returns { truncated: true, outputPath: "tr_..." }, call this to view the full content. Defaults to the first ${VIEW_TRUNCATED_DEFAULT_LINES} lines. Use start_line and end_line (1-indexed, inclusive) to slice. Stored for 7 days.`,
inputSchema: ViewTruncatedOutputInput,
jsonSchema: {
type: 'function',
function: {
name: 'view_truncated_output',
description: `Retrieve the full content of a previously-truncated tool output by its outputPath id. Returns the first ${VIEW_TRUNCATED_DEFAULT_LINES} lines by default; use start_line/end_line to slice. Stored for 7 days.`,
parameters: {
type: 'object',
properties: {
id: { type: 'string', description: 'The outputPath value from an earlier truncated tool result (e.g. "tr_abc123def456").' },
start_line: { type: 'integer', description: 'First line (1-indexed). Default 1.' },
end_line: { type: 'integer', description: `Last line (1-indexed, inclusive). Default ${VIEW_TRUNCATED_DEFAULT_LINES} lines past start.` },
},
required: ['id'],
additionalProperties: false,
},
},
},
async execute(input, _projectRoot) {
const content = await readTruncation(input.id);
if (content === null) {
return {
id: input.id,
content: '',
truncated: false,
error: `No truncation found for id "${input.id}". It may have been pruned (7-day TTL) or never existed.`,
};
}
const lines = content.split('\n');
const total = lines.length;
let start = input.start_line ?? 1;
let end = input.end_line ?? Math.min(total, start + VIEW_TRUNCATED_DEFAULT_LINES - 1);
if (start < 1) start = 1;
if (end > total) end = total;
if (end < start) end = start;
const slice = lines.slice(start - 1, end).join('\n');
// Re-slicing this view isn't truncation in the dual-write sense — the
// model already has the id; no point stashing the slice again.
const truncated = total > end || start > 1;
return {
id: input.id,
content: slice,
total_lines: total,
returned_lines: [start, end],
truncated,
};
},
};
// v1.8 Level 1 branch awareness: gives the model a read-only view of the
// project's git state. No path input — operates on the inference-resolved
// project root via getGitMeta. Subprocess runs with a 2s timeout (see git_meta).
@@ -527,8 +626,14 @@ export const askUserInput: ToolDef<AskUserInputInputT> = {
},
};
// v1.13.3: alpha-sorted by tool.name at module load. llama.cpp's prompt
// cache hits on byte-identical prefixes; the tool list lives near the top
// of the system prompt, so any order drift would invalidate every cached
// turn. Single source of truth for ordering lives here — toolJsonSchemas()
// and TOOLS_BY_NAME inherit it.
export const ALL_TOOLS: ReadonlyArray<ToolDef<unknown>> = [
viewFile as ToolDef<unknown>,
viewTruncatedOutput as ToolDef<unknown>,
listDir as ToolDef<unknown>,
grep as ToolDef<unknown>,
findFiles as ToolDef<unknown>,
@@ -553,7 +658,7 @@ export const ALL_TOOLS: ReadonlyArray<ToolDef<unknown>> = [
watchChanges as ToolDef<unknown>,
getSemanticNeighborhoods as ToolDef<unknown>,
getFrameworkAnalysis as ToolDef<unknown>,
];
].sort((a, b) => a.name.localeCompare(b.name));
// v1.8.2: forward-compatible read-only whitelist. An agent whose `tools` is
// fully contained in this set gets a generous default tool budget (30);
@@ -565,6 +670,7 @@ export const ALL_TOOLS: ReadonlyArray<ToolDef<unknown>> = [
// project state, so it belongs in the read-only set for budget purposes.
export const READ_ONLY_TOOL_NAMES = [
'view_file',
'view_truncated_output',
'list_dir',
'grep',
'find_files',

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,170 @@
import { promises as fs } from 'fs';
import { randomBytes } from 'crypto';
import path from 'path';
import type { Sql } from '../db.js';
// v1.13.5: opencode-style truncation storage. When a tool slice would cut
// content the model might still want, we store the full text on tmpfs and
// hand the model an opaque id. view_truncated_output(id) retrieves it.
//
// Tmpfs path means full content vanishes on container restart; chats that
// outlive a restart lose retrieval (acceptable — the user has usually moved
// on or the data is stale). 7-day TTL + orphan reap bound disk growth via
// the periodic sweeper in index.ts.
export const TRUNCATION_DIR = process.env.BOOCODE_TRUNCATION_DIR ?? '/tmp/boocode-truncations';
export const TRUNCATION_TTL_MS = 7 * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000;
// Matches view_file's MAX_FILE_BYTES — anything bigger was already refused
// at the source tool's size check, so we never see it here.
export const MAX_TRUNCATION_BYTES = 5 * 1024 * 1024;
const ID_RE = /^tr_[0-9a-v]{12}$/;
let dirEnsured = false;
async function ensureDir(): Promise<void> {
if (dirEnsured) return;
await fs.mkdir(TRUNCATION_DIR, { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 });
dirEnsured = true;
}
// 12 base32 chars ≈ 60 bits of entropy. Collision probability across a
// 7-day window with ~thousands of truncations is essentially zero.
function newId(): string {
const buf = randomBytes(8);
const alphabet = '0123456789abcdefghijklmnopqrstuv';
let out = 'tr_';
for (const byte of buf) {
out += alphabet[byte & 0x1f];
out += alphabet[(byte >> 3) & 0x1f];
}
return out.slice(0, 15);
}
function idToPath(id: string): string {
// Defense-in-depth: the model never supplies a path component (only ids),
// but a malformed id from anywhere else shouldn't escape TRUNCATION_DIR.
if (!ID_RE.test(id)) {
throw new Error(`Invalid truncation id: ${id}`);
}
return path.join(TRUNCATION_DIR, id);
}
export async function storeTruncation(fullContent: string): Promise<string> {
const bytes = Buffer.byteLength(fullContent, 'utf8');
if (bytes > MAX_TRUNCATION_BYTES) {
throw new Error(`Truncation content ${bytes}B exceeds ${MAX_TRUNCATION_BYTES}B cap`);
}
await ensureDir();
const id = newId();
await fs.writeFile(idToPath(id), fullContent, { encoding: 'utf8', mode: 0o600 });
return id;
}
export async function readTruncation(id: string): Promise<string | null> {
if (!ID_RE.test(id)) return null;
try {
return await fs.readFile(idToPath(id), { encoding: 'utf8' });
} catch (err) {
if ((err as NodeJS.ErrnoException).code === 'ENOENT') return null;
throw err;
}
}
// Wrap a tool's output. If wasTruncated, stash the full content on tmpfs
// and return its id alongside the sliced view the tool would have returned.
// Storage failure (disk full, permission denied) is non-fatal — the sliced
// view ships without an outputPath, which is exactly what the tool returned
// before v1.13.5. Same goes for content over MAX_TRUNCATION_BYTES.
export async function truncateIfNeeded(args: {
fullContent: string;
slicedContent: string;
wasTruncated: boolean;
}): Promise<{ content: string; truncated: boolean; outputPath?: string }> {
if (!args.wasTruncated) {
return { content: args.slicedContent, truncated: false };
}
const bytes = Buffer.byteLength(args.fullContent, 'utf8');
if (bytes > MAX_TRUNCATION_BYTES) {
return { content: args.slicedContent, truncated: true };
}
try {
const outputPath = await storeTruncation(args.fullContent);
return { content: args.slicedContent, truncated: true, outputPath };
} catch {
return { content: args.slicedContent, truncated: true };
}
}
// Periodic cleanup. Called from index.ts's sweep interval (v1.13.3 cadence).
// Pass 1: TTL — anything older than TRUNCATION_TTL_MS is gone.
// Pass 2: orphans — files with no live message_parts.payload->'output'->>'outputPath'
// reference. Catches the case where a part referencing an outputPath got
// hidden by prune (v1.13.4) and the file is now unreachable.
export async function cleanupTruncations(args: {
sql: Sql;
log: { warn: (obj: object, msg: string) => void; error: (obj: object, msg: string) => void };
}): Promise<{ ttlReaped: number; orphanReaped: number }> {
await ensureDir();
const cutoff = Date.now() - TRUNCATION_TTL_MS;
let ttlReaped = 0;
let orphanReaped = 0;
let entries: string[];
try {
entries = await fs.readdir(TRUNCATION_DIR);
} catch (err) {
args.log.error({ err }, 'cleanupTruncations readdir failed');
return { ttlReaped, orphanReaped };
}
if (entries.length === 0) return { ttlReaped, orphanReaped };
const survivors: string[] = [];
for (const name of entries) {
if (!ID_RE.test(name)) continue;
const full = path.join(TRUNCATION_DIR, name);
try {
const stat = await fs.stat(full);
if (stat.mtimeMs < cutoff) {
await fs.unlink(full);
ttlReaped += 1;
} else {
survivors.push(name);
}
} catch {
// File vanished between readdir and stat — fine.
}
}
if (survivors.length === 0) {
if (ttlReaped > 0) {
args.log.warn({ ttlReaped, orphanReaped: 0 }, 'cleanupTruncations reaped files');
}
return { ttlReaped, orphanReaped: 0 };
}
// outputPath rides inside the tool_result part's payload.output object
// (see partsFromToolMessage in inference/parts.ts), so the json path is
// payload->'output'->>'outputPath' rather than top-level.
const referenced = await args.sql<{ output_path: string }[]>`
SELECT DISTINCT p.payload->'output'->>'outputPath' AS output_path
FROM message_parts p
WHERE p.kind = 'tool_result'
AND p.payload->'output' ? 'outputPath'
AND p.payload->'output'->>'outputPath' = ANY(${survivors})
`;
const live = new Set(referenced.map((r) => r.output_path));
for (const name of survivors) {
if (live.has(name)) continue;
try {
await fs.unlink(path.join(TRUNCATION_DIR, name));
orphanReaped += 1;
} catch {
// ignore
}
}
if (ttlReaped > 0 || orphanReaped > 0) {
args.log.warn({ ttlReaped, orphanReaped }, 'cleanupTruncations reaped files');
}
return { ttlReaped, orphanReaped };
}

View File

@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
import { z } from 'zod';
import { isPublicUrl } from './url_guard.js';
import type { ToolDef } from './tools.js';
import { truncateIfNeeded } from './truncate.js';
const WebFetchInput = z.object({
url: z.string().min(1).max(2048),
@@ -230,15 +231,24 @@ export async function executeWebFetch(
}
const truncated = truncate(textRaw, maxChars);
// v1.13.5: stash the full pre-slice body when truncation fires so the
// model can pull more via view_truncated_output(id) without re-fetching.
// textRaw is already bounded by MAX_BYTES (5MB), within truncate.ts's cap.
const wrapped = await truncateIfNeeded({
fullContent: textRaw,
slicedContent: truncated.content,
wasTruncated: truncated.truncated,
});
// Report the FINAL URL (post-redirects) so the LLM knows where the body
// came from — useful for citations and for the model to reason about
// domain trust.
return {
url: currentUrl,
title,
content: truncated.content,
content: wrapped.content,
content_type: contentType,
truncated: truncated.truncated,
truncated: wrapped.truncated,
...(wrapped.outputPath ? { outputPath: wrapped.outputPath } : {}),
};
}