// v1.13.17-cross-repo-reads: derives the grant root for a path the user is
// being asked to approve cross-repo read access to.
//
// Per design decision D1: grant unit = nearest registered project root,
// then nearest path-whitelist ancestor that looks like a repo root, then
// refuse. Granting the literal file path is too narrow (next file in the
// same repo re-prompts). Granting an arbitrary parent dir over-scopes.
//
// The resolver runs in two contexts:
//   1. request_read_access.execute  — pre-prompt validation (cheap; bails
//      early if the path can't plausibly be granted so the user is never
//      asked about /etc/passwd)
//   2. POST /api/chats/:id/grant_read_access — at decision time, re-derives
//      the root and persists it on sessions.allowed_read_paths
//
// Sam (2026-05-22 dispatch confirmation): "in the project-root resolver
// ancestor walk, stop the moment parent exits PROJECT_ROOT_WHITELIST or hits
// filesystem root — check on every iteration, not just final parent.
// Symlinked input must not be able to escape the whitelist during the
// walk." Hence the loop here checks both the walk bound AND the still-
// inside-whitelist invariant every step.

import { access, realpath } from 'node:fs/promises';
import { constants } from 'node:fs';
import { dirname, isAbsolute, sep } from 'node:path';
import type { Sql } from '../db.js';

// Files whose presence in a directory marks it as a repo root for grant
// purposes. Kept narrow on purpose; broader heuristics (e.g. ".project",
// "pyproject.toml") can be added with measured intent. Each entry is a
// literal basename — no globs.
const REPO_MARKERS: ReadonlyArray<string> = [
  '.git',
  'package.json',
  'go.mod',
  'Cargo.toml',
];

export type GrantResolution =
  | { ok: true; root: string; source: 'project' | 'whitelist' }
  | { ok: false; reason: string };

function isUnder(child: string, parent: string): boolean {
  return child === parent || child.startsWith(parent + sep);
}

async function exists(path: string): Promise<boolean> {
  try {
    await access(path, constants.F_OK);
    return true;
  } catch {
    return false;
  }
}

async function isRepoShaped(dir: string): Promise<boolean> {
  for (const marker of REPO_MARKERS) {
    if (await exists(`${dir}${sep}${marker}`)) return true;
  }
  return false;
}

// Resolves an absolute path to its grant root or refuses with a reason
// string suitable for surfacing to the model. Pure helper — no DB writes,
// no broker publishes. Caller persists the root on session.allowed_read_paths
// if it wants the grant to stick.
//
// Arguments:
//   sql                   — used only to read projects.path (no writes)
//   requestedPath         — absolute path the model wants to read
//   projectRoot           — the session's primary project root (already
//                           realpath'd by caller). Used to short-circuit
//                           "already in scope".
//   whitelistRoot         — PROJECT_ROOT_WHITELIST from config (default /opt).
//                           Walk bound for the repo-shape fallback.
//
// Returns { ok: true, root, source } on success; { ok: false, reason } else.
export async function resolveGrantRoot(
  sql: Sql,
  requestedPath: string,
  projectRoot: string,
  whitelistRoot: string,
): Promise<GrantResolution> {
  if (typeof requestedPath !== 'string' || requestedPath.length === 0) {
    return { ok: false, reason: 'path is required' };
  }
  if (!isAbsolute(requestedPath)) {
    return { ok: false, reason: 'path must be absolute' };
  }

  // Resolve symlinks so subsequent ancestor checks compare apples-to-apples
  // with realpath'd projectRoot. If the path doesn't exist at all, bail
  // before bothering the user — the model is asking about a phantom.
  let real: string;
  try {
    real = await realpath(requestedPath);
  } catch {
    return { ok: false, reason: `path does not exist: ${requestedPath}` };
  }

  // Whitelist guard. Symlinked inputs can resolve outside the whitelist
  // even when the surface-form path looks inside it; that's why we test
  // the *real* path here, not the requested one.
  let realWhitelist: string;
  try {
    realWhitelist = await realpath(whitelistRoot);
  } catch {
    return { ok: false, reason: `whitelist root does not exist: ${whitelistRoot}` };
  }
  if (!isUnder(real, realWhitelist)) {
    return { ok: false, reason: 'path outside permitted scope' };
  }

  // Already in scope? No prompt needed; the tool's caller should retry.
  if (isUnder(real, projectRoot)) {
    return { ok: false, reason: 'path already accessible without a grant' };
  }

  // Look for a registered project whose root is an ancestor of the
  // requested path. Pick the LONGEST match (nearest ancestor wins) so
  // sub-projects don't get over-broadened.
  const projectRows = await sql<{ path: string }[]>`
    SELECT path FROM projects WHERE status = 'open'
  `;
  let bestProject: string | null = null;
  for (const row of projectRows) {
    if (!row.path) continue;
    if (!isUnder(real, row.path)) continue;
    if (bestProject === null || row.path.length > bestProject.length) {
      bestProject = row.path;
    }
  }
  if (bestProject !== null) {
    return { ok: true, root: bestProject, source: 'project' };
  }

  // Repo-shape fallback. Walk from the requested path upward toward the
  // whitelist root. At every iteration: confirm we're still inside the
  // whitelist (so a symlinked component can't slip the bound mid-walk)
  // and confirm we haven't hit the filesystem root. The first dir with a
  // REPO_MARKER child is the grant root.
  let cursor = real;
  while (true) {
    // Don't grant the whitelist root itself — that would be far too broad.
    if (cursor === realWhitelist) {
      return { ok: false, reason: 'no repo-shaped ancestor found under whitelist' };
    }
    if (!isUnder(cursor, realWhitelist)) {
      return { ok: false, reason: 'path outside permitted scope' };
    }
    const parent = dirname(cursor);
    if (parent === cursor) {
      // Hit filesystem root without finding a repo marker.
      return { ok: false, reason: 'no repo-shaped ancestor found under whitelist' };
    }
    if (await isRepoShaped(cursor)) {
      return { ok: true, root: cursor, source: 'whitelist' };
    }
    cursor = parent;
  }
}