Files
boocode/apps/server/src/services/inference/tool-phase.ts
indifferentketchup 164a24357b v1.13.17-cross-repo-reads: on-demand read access to paths outside the project root
When the agent needed context from another repo, pathGuard rejected every read
with no recovery path. This batch adds a reactive request_read_access flow:
pathGuard's error now hints at the tool, the model emits a structured request,
the inference loop pauses (same mechanism as ask_user_input), the user picks
Allow/Deny via inline chips, and subsequent reads under the granted root succeed
for the rest of the session.

Schema: sessions.allowed_read_paths TEXT[] NOT NULL DEFAULT ARRAY[]::TEXT[]
(idempotent ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS).

Grant unit (design D1): nearest registered projects.path ancestor →
nearest repo-shaped ancestor (.git/ / package.json / go.mod / Cargo.toml)
under PROJECT_ROOT_WHITELIST → else refuse. grant_resolver.ts walks
ancestors with a per-iteration whitelist invariant check so symlinked
input can't escape the whitelist mid-walk (Sam's checkpoint-1 ask).

Path-guard: optional extraRoots arg threaded from session.allowed_read_paths
through executeToolCall to view_file / list_dir / grep / find_files. The
ToolDef.execute signature gets an optional third param; non-FS tools
ignore it. view_file re-anchors the secret-guard check on basename(real)
whenever a relative path starts with "../" so .env / id_rsa* etc. still
deny across grant roots.

Endpoint: POST /api/chats/:id/grant_read_access mirrors /answer_user_input.
On 'allow' it re-resolves the grant root (state may have changed since
prompt — auto-falls to denial reason text on failure, not 500), array_appends
to sessions.allowed_read_paths with in-memory dedup, then publishes
tool_result + session_updated frames and enqueues the next assistant turn.

PATCH /api/sessions/:id allowed_read_paths supports revocation only. Zod
refines absolute + no traversal markers; runtime findUnauthorizedAdditions
guard rejects any entry not already present in the row, so a malicious
curl -X PATCH -d '{"allowed_read_paths":["/etc"]}' returns 400 instead of
bypassing the grant flow (Sam's compliance-review action item).

Frontend: RequestReadAccessCard renders pending (path + reason + Allow/Deny)
and answered (granted/denied summary with the resolved root) variants;
MessageList.flatten/group special-cases the tool name; SettingsPane adds a
per-session grants list with per-row revoke that PATCHes the shortened
array.

Tests: 11 grant_resolver, 8 path_guard, 8 sessions PATCH subset, including
explicit cases for symlink escape mid-walk, walk-bound termination at
whitelist root, /etc bypass attempt via PATCH, and nearest-project
disambiguation. 292 total server tests green.

Pairs with v1.13.16-xml-parser — the model now self-recovers from both
a wrong tool name AND from a refused path.
2026-05-22 21:45:52 +00:00

385 lines
16 KiB
TypeScript

import type { Session, ToolCall } from '../../types/api.js';
import * as modelContext from '../model-context.js';
import { PathScopeError } from '../path_guard.js';
import { TOOLS_BY_NAME } from '../tools.js';
import { maybeFlagForCompaction } from './payload.js';
import { insertParts, partsFromAssistantMessage, partsFromToolMessage } from './parts.js';
// v1.13.16: richer unknown-tool error so the model can self-correct when it
// drifts to a Claude Code tool name (e.g. read_file → suggest view_file).
// Applies to all unknown tool names, not just <invoke>-derived ones — at the
// dispatch layer we no longer know which format produced the call, and the
// extra signal is harmless for Qwen-derived calls.
import { formatUnknownToolError } from './tool-suggestions.js';
// v1.13.17-cross-repo-reads: pre-prompt validation for request_read_access.
// Resolves the grant root before pausing the loop so the user is never
// prompted about paths we couldn't grant anyway (e.g. /etc/passwd).
import { resolveGrantRoot } from '../grant_resolver.js';
import type {
InferenceContext,
StreamResult,
TurnArgs,
} from './turn.js';
// v1.12.4: ESM value-import cycle. executeToolPhase recurses into
// runAssistantTurn which lives in inference.ts. The cycle is safe because
// the reference is read at call time (inside an async function body), not
// at module top-level. Node + tsc resolve this cleanly.
import { runAssistantTurn } from './turn.js';
// v1.13.13: synthesis pipeline — replaces the immediate recursive turn when
// any of this batch's tool calls is in SYNTHESIS_TOOLS. Falls through to
// recursion on synthesis failure (timeout / model error). See module header
// in synthesisPipeline.ts for the auto-fetch + token-budget rules.
import { SYNTHESIS_TOOLS, runSynthesisPass } from '../synthesisPipeline.js';
async function executeToolCall(
projectRoot: string,
toolCall: ToolCall,
extraRoots: readonly string[],
): Promise<{ output: unknown; truncated: boolean; error?: string }> {
const tool = TOOLS_BY_NAME[toolCall.name];
if (!tool) {
return {
output: null,
truncated: false,
error: formatUnknownToolError(toolCall.name, Object.keys(TOOLS_BY_NAME)),
};
}
const parsed = tool.inputSchema.safeParse(toolCall.args);
if (!parsed.success) {
// v1.12 Track B.2: enrich the zod-reject path so the model sees a
// one-line, tool-named hint ("tool 'search_symbols' rejected — query:
// Required") instead of a JSON blob of flatten output. Higher recovery
// rate on the next turn; doom-loop guard still bounds infinite retries.
// The cast is because tool.inputSchema is ZodType<unknown>, so zod can't
// statically narrow flatten()'s fieldErrors key set — but the runtime
// shape is the standard { formErrors: string[]; fieldErrors: Record<...> }.
const flatten = parsed.error.flatten() as {
formErrors: string[];
fieldErrors: Record<string, string[] | undefined>;
};
const fieldErrors = Object.entries(flatten.fieldErrors)
.map(([field, errs]) => `${field}: ${errs?.[0] ?? 'invalid'}`)
.join('; ');
const formError = flatten.formErrors[0];
const hint = fieldErrors || formError || 'unknown validation error';
return {
output: null,
truncated: false,
error: `tool '${toolCall.name}' rejected — ${hint}`,
};
}
try {
const output = await tool.execute(parsed.data, projectRoot, extraRoots);
const truncated =
typeof output === 'object' && output !== null && 'truncated' in output
? Boolean((output as { truncated: unknown }).truncated)
: false;
return { output, truncated };
} catch (err) {
if (err instanceof PathScopeError) {
return { output: null, truncated: false, error: err.message };
}
return {
output: null,
truncated: false,
error: err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err),
};
}
}
export async function executeToolPhase(
ctx: InferenceContext,
args: TurnArgs,
result: StreamResult,
startedAt: string | null,
session: Session,
projectRoot: string
): Promise<void> {
const { sessionId, chatId, assistantMessageId, toolsUsed, signal } = args;
const { content, toolCalls, promptTokens, completionTokens } = result;
// v1.11.3: ctx_max comes from llama-swap /upstream/<model>/props, not the
// streaming completion (which doesn't emit n_ctx). getModelContext caches
// the positive lookup for the process lifetime, so this is a single Map
// hit after the first invocation per model.
const mctx = await modelContext.getModelContext(session.model);
const nCtx = mctx?.n_ctx ?? null;
const [updated] = await ctx.sql<
{ tokens_used: number | null; ctx_used: number | null; ctx_max: number | null; finished_at: string | null }[]
>`
UPDATE messages
SET content = ${content},
status = 'complete',
tool_calls = ${ctx.sql.json(toolCalls as never)},
tokens_used = ${completionTokens},
ctx_used = ${promptTokens},
ctx_max = ${nCtx},
finished_at = clock_timestamp()
WHERE id = ${assistantMessageId}
RETURNING tokens_used, ctx_used, ctx_max, finished_at
`;
// v1.13.0: dual-write to message_parts. v1.13.1-B made parts authoritative
// for reads via the messages_with_parts view; the JSON column write above
// remains for v1.13.1 fallback compatibility (dropped in v1.13.2).
// v1.13.1-C: include result.reasoning so models with separate reasoning
// channels (qwen3.6) get a kind='reasoning' part at sequence 0.
// TODO(v1.13.1): wrap the UPDATE above and this insertParts in a single
// sql.begin before flipping read authority to message_parts. Without the
// transaction, a crash between the two leaves an orphan message that
// becomes invisible in the parts-authoritative read path.
await insertParts(
ctx.sql,
partsFromAssistantMessage({
content,
tool_calls: toolCalls,
reasoning: result.reasoning,
}).map((p) => ({
...p,
message_id: assistantMessageId,
})),
);
// v1.11: flag for compaction if this turn pushed us over the usable budget.
// We never compact mid-loop (the recursive runAssistantTurn keeps tools
// flowing); the flag fires on the NEXT turn's pre-fetch hook above.
await maybeFlagForCompaction(ctx, chatId, updated);
const [toolSessRow] = await ctx.sql<{ project_id: string; name: string; updated_at: string }[]>`
UPDATE sessions SET updated_at = clock_timestamp()
WHERE id = ${sessionId}
RETURNING project_id, name, updated_at
`;
ctx.publishUser({ type: 'session_updated', session_id: sessionId, project_id: toolSessRow!.project_id, name: toolSessRow!.name, updated_at: toolSessRow!.updated_at });
for (const tc of toolCalls) {
ctx.publish(sessionId, {
type: 'tool_call',
message_id: assistantMessageId,
chat_id: chatId,
tool_call: tc,
});
}
ctx.publish(sessionId, {
type: 'message_complete',
message_id: assistantMessageId,
chat_id: chatId,
tokens_used: updated?.tokens_used ?? null,
ctx_used: updated?.ctx_used ?? null,
ctx_max: updated?.ctx_max ?? null,
started_at: startedAt,
finished_at: updated?.finished_at ?? null,
model: session.model,
});
// Batch 9.7: ask_user_input pauses the loop. The tool row is still inserted
// (the answer endpoint needs a target row to UPDATE), but tool_results is
// pre-stamped with output=null as a "pending" sentinel and no tool_result
// frame goes out — the card renders from the tool_call frame alone. Mixed
// batches still execute the other tools normally.
ctx.publishUser({ type: 'chat_status', chat_id: chatId, status: 'tool_running', at: new Date().toISOString() });
let pausingForUserInput = false;
// v1.13.13: capture synth-tool result text so the synthesis pipeline below
// doesn't have to re-fetch from DB. Array (not single) because a batch
// could theoretically include multiple synthesis tools — we take the first
// for the synthesis input. Race-free under Promise.all because each
// callback pushes its own captured value.
const synthEntries: Array<{ tc: ToolCall; output: unknown; error?: string }> = [];
await Promise.all(
toolCalls.map(async (tc) => {
const [toolRow] = await ctx.sql<{ id: string }[]>`
INSERT INTO messages (session_id, chat_id, role, content, status, created_at)
VALUES (${sessionId}, ${chatId}, 'tool', '', 'complete', clock_timestamp())
RETURNING id
`;
const toolMessageId = toolRow!.id;
if (tc.name === 'ask_user_input') {
pausingForUserInput = true;
const sentinel = { tool_call_id: tc.id, output: null, truncated: false };
await ctx.sql`
UPDATE messages
SET tool_results = ${ctx.sql.json(sentinel as never)}
WHERE id = ${toolMessageId}
`;
// v1.13.0: mirror the pending sentinel into message_parts. The
// answer-endpoint UPDATE later (messages.ts:576) will delete and
// re-insert this part when the user submits their answer.
// TODO(v1.13.1): wrap the INSERT + UPDATE + insertParts triple in
// a per-iteration sql.begin before flipping read authority.
await insertParts(
ctx.sql,
partsFromToolMessage({ tool_results: sentinel }).map((p) => ({
...p,
message_id: toolMessageId,
})),
);
return;
}
// v1.13.17-cross-repo-reads: request_read_access pauses identically to
// ask_user_input EXCEPT for an up-front validation pass — if the path
// can't be granted under the whitelist / repo-shape rules, surface an
// immediate denial without prompting the user. Per design D1, we never
// ask the user about /etc/passwd or paths outside PROJECT_ROOT_WHITELIST.
if (tc.name === 'request_read_access') {
const tcArgs = tc.args as { path?: unknown; reason?: unknown };
const requested =
typeof tcArgs.path === 'string' ? tcArgs.path : '';
const resolution = await resolveGrantRoot(
ctx.sql,
requested,
projectRoot,
ctx.config.PROJECT_ROOT_WHITELIST,
);
if (!resolution.ok) {
// Auto-deny without pausing. The model sees the reason on its
// next turn and decides what to do.
const stored = {
tool_call_id: tc.id,
output: `denied: ${resolution.reason}`,
truncated: false,
};
await ctx.sql`
UPDATE messages
SET tool_results = ${ctx.sql.json(stored as never)}
WHERE id = ${toolMessageId}
`;
await insertParts(
ctx.sql,
partsFromToolMessage({ tool_results: stored }).map((p) => ({
...p,
message_id: toolMessageId,
})),
);
ctx.publish(sessionId, {
type: 'tool_result',
tool_message_id: toolMessageId,
chat_id: chatId,
tool_call_id: tc.id,
output: stored.output,
truncated: false,
});
return;
}
// Path is plausibly grantable — install the pending sentinel and
// pause. The grant endpoint re-derives the root at decision time
// (state may have changed in the meantime) so we don't stash it here.
pausingForUserInput = true;
const sentinel = { tool_call_id: tc.id, output: null, truncated: false };
await ctx.sql`
UPDATE messages
SET tool_results = ${ctx.sql.json(sentinel as never)}
WHERE id = ${toolMessageId}
`;
await insertParts(
ctx.sql,
partsFromToolMessage({ tool_results: sentinel }).map((p) => ({
...p,
message_id: toolMessageId,
})),
);
return;
}
const tres = await executeToolCall(projectRoot, tc, session.allowed_read_paths);
if (SYNTHESIS_TOOLS.has(tc.name)) {
synthEntries.push({ tc, output: tres.output, ...(tres.error ? { error: tres.error } : {}) });
}
const stored = {
tool_call_id: tc.id,
output: tres.output,
truncated: tres.truncated,
...(tres.error ? { error: tres.error } : {}),
};
await ctx.sql`
UPDATE messages
SET tool_results = ${ctx.sql.json(stored as never)}
WHERE id = ${toolMessageId}
`;
// v1.13.0: dual-write the tool_result part.
// TODO(v1.13.1): wrap the INSERT + UPDATE + insertParts triple in a
// per-iteration sql.begin before flipping read authority.
await insertParts(
ctx.sql,
partsFromToolMessage({ tool_results: stored }).map((p) => ({
...p,
message_id: toolMessageId,
})),
);
ctx.publish(sessionId, {
type: 'tool_result',
tool_message_id: toolMessageId,
chat_id: chatId,
tool_call_id: tc.id,
output: tres.output,
truncated: tres.truncated,
...(tres.error ? { error: tres.error } : {}),
});
})
);
if (pausingForUserInput) {
ctx.publishUser({
type: 'chat_status',
chat_id: chatId,
status: 'waiting_for_input',
at: new Date().toISOString(),
});
ctx.log.info(
{ sessionId, chatId, assistantMessageId },
'inference paused awaiting user input',
);
return;
}
// v1.13.13: synthesis-pipeline branch. When any of this batch's tool calls
// is a codecontext overview/analysis tool that produced a non-error result,
// run a forced second-inference synthesis pass with auto-fetched files +
// project docs instead of the normal recursive runAssistantTurn. Falls
// through to the recursive call on synthesis failure (timeout, model
// error). User-abort re-throws so the outer handler runs.
const synthEntry = synthEntries.find((e) => !e.error && e.output != null);
if (synthEntry) {
// codecontext wrappers return { result: string, truncated: boolean, ... }.
// Defensive: stringify the output if it isn't the expected shape so the
// synthesis still has something to chew on rather than crashing on
// missing `.result`.
const out = synthEntry.output as { result?: unknown; truncated?: boolean; outputPath?: string };
const toolResultText =
typeof out?.result === 'string'
? out.result
: JSON.stringify(synthEntry.output);
// v1.13.15-b: forward the wrapper's truncation flag + opaque tmpfs id so
// synthesisPipeline can re-read the full content for reference extraction.
const ran = await runSynthesisPass({
ctx,
args,
session,
projectRoot,
toolName: synthEntry.tc.name,
toolResultText,
...(typeof out?.truncated === 'boolean' ? { truncated: out.truncated } : {}),
...(typeof out?.outputPath === 'string' ? { outputPath: out.outputPath } : {}),
});
if (ran) return;
// ran === false → synthesis failed (timeout / model error) → fall through
// to the standard recursive turn below. The synth message (if created)
// was already marked status='failed' inside runSynthesisPass.
}
const [nextAssistant] = await ctx.sql<{ id: string }[]>`
INSERT INTO messages (session_id, chat_id, role, content, status, created_at)
VALUES (${sessionId}, ${chatId}, 'assistant', '', 'streaming', clock_timestamp())
RETURNING id
`;
await runAssistantTurn(ctx, {
sessionId,
chatId,
assistantMessageId: nextAssistant!.id,
// v1.8.2: charge this turn's actual tool invocations against the budget.
// One assistant message can emit multiple tool_calls, so we add the run
// count, not 1. The next turn's budget check sees the cumulative total.
toolsUsed: toolsUsed + result.toolCalls.length,
// v1.11.6: append the just-executed tool calls to the per-turn history
// so the next runAssistantTurn's doom-loop check can see them. We don't
// cap the array length here — per-turn budgets keep it bounded
// (typically <30 entries), and slicing happens inside detectDoomLoop.
recentToolCalls: [...args.recentToolCalls, ...result.toolCalls],
signal,
});
}