fix(coder): separator-bounded worktree path guard in acp-client-fs

The ACP fs bridge's worktree guard used an unbounded `startsWith(resolve(
worktreePath))`, so a sibling path sharing the worktree as a string prefix
(`<worktree>-evil/...`) escaped the scope. Since writeWorktreeTextFile hits disk
directly (no pending_changes gate), a confused/buggy ACP agent could write
outside its worktree. Now uses a separator-bounded check matching write_guard.ts
(resolve() + `startsWith(root + sep)` / `=== root`) via a shared resolveInWorktree,
with a regression test (../ traversal + the sibling-prefix bug). Symlink-swap
hardening intentionally skipped — consistent with write_guard's no-realpath
stance; the agent runs with host FS access so this is a containment guard, not a
trust boundary. Flagged by the automated push security review.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

apps/coder/src/services/__tests__/acp-client-fs.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+import { describe, it, expect, afterEach } from 'vitest';
+import { mkdtempSync, rmSync } from 'node:fs';
+import { tmpdir } from 'node:os';
+import { join } from 'node:path';
+import { readWorktreeTextFile, writeWorktreeTextFile } from '../acp-client-fs.js';
+
+const created: string[] = [];
+function freshWorktree(): string {
+  const wt = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'acp-wt-'));
+  created.push(wt);
+  return wt;
+}
+afterEach(() => {
+  for (const d of created.splice(0)) {
+    try {
+      rmSync(d, { recursive: true, force: true });
+      rmSync(`${d}-evil`, { recursive: true, force: true });
+    } catch {
+      /* ignore */
+    }
+  }
+});
+
+describe('acp-client-fs worktree scoping', () => {
+  it('writes then reads a file inside the worktree', async () => {
+    const wt = freshWorktree();
+    await writeWorktreeTextFile(wt, 'sub/dir/note.txt', 'hello');
+    expect(await readWorktreeTextFile(wt, 'sub/dir/note.txt')).toBe('hello');
+  });
+
+  it('rejects ../ traversal on read', async () => {
+    const wt = freshWorktree();
+    await expect(readWorktreeTextFile(wt, '../../etc/passwd')).rejects.toThrow(/escapes worktree/);
+  });
+
+  it('rejects ../ traversal on write', async () => {
+    const wt = freshWorktree();
+    await expect(writeWorktreeTextFile(wt, '../escape.txt', 'x')).rejects.toThrow(/escapes worktree/);
+  });
+
+  it('rejects a sibling-prefix path (the unbounded-startsWith bug)', async () => {
+    const wt = freshWorktree();
+    // Absolute path that shares the worktree as a STRING prefix but is a sibling
+    // dir: `<wt>-evil/...`. A bare `startsWith(<wt>)` wrongly admits it.
+    await expect(readWorktreeTextFile(wt, `${wt}-evil/secret.txt`)).rejects.toThrow(/escapes worktree/);
+    await expect(writeWorktreeTextFile(wt, `${wt}-evil/secret.txt`, 'x')).rejects.toThrow(
+      /escapes worktree/,
+    );
+  });
+});

apps/coder/src/services/acp-client-fs.ts

@@ -1,5 +1,25 @@
 import { promises as fs } from 'node:fs';
-import { dirname, isAbsolute, join, resolve } from 'node:path';
+import { dirname, isAbsolute, resolve, sep } from 'node:path';
+
+/**
+ * Resolve an ACP-supplied path against the agent worktree and reject anything
+ * that escapes it. Mirrors `write_guard.ts`'s check: `resolve()` to normalize
+ * `../` segments, then a **separator-bounded** prefix test — a bare
+ * `startsWith(root)` wrongly admits a sibling dir like `<root>-evil/...`.
+ *
+ * No realpath (consistent with `write_guard.ts`: the target may not exist yet on
+ * write). This is a containment guard for the ACP fs bridge, not a hard trust
+ * boundary — the agent process already runs with host FS access; symlink-swap
+ * hardening (`O_NOFOLLOW`/realpath) is out of scope here.
+ */
+function resolveInWorktree(worktreePath: string, filePath: string): string {
+  const root = resolve(worktreePath);
+  const absolute = isAbsolute(filePath) ? resolve(filePath) : resolve(root, filePath);
+  if (absolute !== root && !absolute.startsWith(root + sep)) {
+    throw new Error(`path escapes worktree: ${filePath}`);
+  }
+  return absolute;
+}
 
 /** Resolve an ACP path against the agent worktree and read a slice of lines. */
 export async function readWorktreeTextFile(
@@ -8,10 +28,7 @@ export async function readWorktreeTextFile(
   line?: number | null,
   limit?: number | null,
 ): Promise<string> {
-  const absolute = isAbsolute(filePath) ? filePath : resolve(worktreePath, filePath);
-  if (!absolute.startsWith(resolve(worktreePath))) {
-    throw new Error(`path escapes worktree: ${filePath}`);
-  }
+  const absolute = resolveInWorktree(worktreePath, filePath);
   const raw = await fs.readFile(absolute, 'utf8');
   if (!line && !limit) return raw;
   const lines = raw.split(/\r?\n/);
@@ -26,10 +43,7 @@ export async function writeWorktreeTextFile(
   filePath: string,
   content: string,
 ): Promise<void> {
-  const absolute = isAbsolute(filePath) ? filePath : resolve(worktreePath, filePath);
-  if (!absolute.startsWith(resolve(worktreePath))) {
-    throw new Error(`path escapes worktree: ${filePath}`);
-  }
+  const absolute = resolveInWorktree(worktreePath, filePath);
   await fs.mkdir(dirname(absolute), { recursive: true });
   await fs.writeFile(absolute, content, 'utf8');
 }