Compare commits

...

1 Commits

2 changed files with 187 additions and 18 deletions

View File

@@ -295,9 +295,10 @@ describe('executeWebFetch — size + truncation', () => {
// 1.5M U+1F600 emojis: each is length 2 in UTF-16 (surrogate pair) and
// 4 bytes in UTF-8. body.length = 3,000,000 chars (~2.86 MiB by
// UTF-16 count) but Buffer.byteLength = 6,000,000 bytes (>5 MiB).
// Pre-fix the char-count comparison let this through; the byte-count
// check now rejects. No Content-Length header so the pre-flight
// guard doesn't fire — we're testing the POST-consumption check.
// v1.11.10: streaming reader catches this as body_too_large (was
// response_too_large in the post-consumption check). No
// Content-Length header so the pre-flight pass and the streaming
// path is the one that rejects.
const heavy = '😀'.repeat(1_500_000);
const fakeFetch = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(
new Response(heavy, { status: 200, headers: { 'content-type': 'text/plain' } }),
@@ -308,9 +309,8 @@ describe('executeWebFetch — size + truncation', () => {
);
expect('error' in result).toBe(true);
if ('error' in result) {
expect(result.error).toBe('response_too_large');
// Error reason should reference bytes, not character count.
expect(result.reason).toMatch(/bytes/);
expect(result.error).toBe('body_too_large');
expect(result.reason).toMatch(/exceeded/);
}
});
@@ -453,3 +453,138 @@ describe('executeWebFetch — redirect handling', () => {
expect(fakeFetch.mock.calls[1]![0]).toBe('https://example.com/foo');
});
});
// ============================================================================
// v1.11.10: streaming body cap — abort the response stream at MAX_BYTES
// ============================================================================
// MAX_BYTES is 5 * 1024 * 1024 = 5_242_880. Repeating this here (rather
// than importing) so a change to the cap surfaces as a test failure —
// the limit is part of the public contract.
const MAX_BYTES_TEST = 5 * 1024 * 1024;
// Build a Response whose body is a real ReadableStream. Uses pull() (not
// start()) so chunks are produced lazily — without backpressure, an
// unbounded start() enqueues everything and calls controller.close()
// before the consumer reads, which means a subsequent reader.cancel()
// finds the stream already closed and the cancel callback never fires.
// `cancelFlag` lets the test observe whether reader.cancel() reached the
// underlying source mid-stream.
function streamedResponse(
chunks: Uint8Array[],
init: { contentType?: string; contentLength?: number | null; cancelFlag?: { cancelled: boolean } } = {},
): Response {
let idx = 0;
const stream = new ReadableStream({
pull(controller) {
if (idx >= chunks.length) {
controller.close();
return;
}
controller.enqueue(chunks[idx]!);
idx += 1;
},
cancel() {
if (init.cancelFlag) init.cancelFlag.cancelled = true;
},
});
const headers: Record<string, string> = {};
if (init.contentType) headers['content-type'] = init.contentType;
if (init.contentLength !== undefined && init.contentLength !== null) {
headers['content-length'] = String(init.contentLength);
}
return new Response(stream, { status: 200, headers });
}
describe('executeWebFetch — streaming body cap (v1.11.10)', () => {
it('aborts the stream when a server lies about Content-Length and emits over the cap', async () => {
// Honest header would have failed the pre-flight check. The lie is
// the point: pre-flight passes (100 < 5MB) and the streaming reader
// has to be the thing that catches the oversized body.
//
// Chunk count is deliberately higher than what the reader will
// consume (10 × 1MB available, but the reader will cancel after ~6
// chunks land it over 5MB). That headroom keeps the stream in
// 'readable' state at the moment reader.cancel() runs — otherwise
// a pull-then-close race could make the source close the stream
// before cancel reaches it, and the cancel() callback wouldn't fire.
const oneMB = new Uint8Array(1024 * 1024).fill(65); // 'A'
const tenMBInChunks = Array.from({ length: 10 }, () => oneMB);
const cancelFlag = { cancelled: false };
const fakeFetch = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(
streamedResponse(tenMBInChunks, {
contentType: 'text/plain',
contentLength: 100,
cancelFlag,
}),
);
const result = await executeWebFetch(
{ url: 'https://example.com/lying-server' },
fakeFetch as unknown as typeof fetch,
);
expect('error' in result).toBe(true);
if ('error' in result) {
expect(result.error).toBe('body_too_large');
expect(result.reason).toMatch(/exceeded/);
}
// Critical: reader.cancel() actually fired so the underlying
// connection / stream got released. Otherwise the abort would be
// notional and the server could keep streaming.
expect(cancelFlag.cancelled).toBe(true);
});
it('catches an oversized stream when Content-Length is omitted entirely', async () => {
// Many real servers (chunked transfer-encoding, dynamic responses)
// never send Content-Length. The pre-flight check has nothing to
// gate on; the streaming reader is the only line of defense.
// 10 chunks vs the ~6 the reader will consume — same headroom
// rationale as the lying-Content-Length test above.
const oneMB = new Uint8Array(1024 * 1024).fill(66); // 'B'
const tenMBInChunks = Array.from({ length: 10 }, () => oneMB);
const fakeFetch = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(
streamedResponse(tenMBInChunks, { contentType: 'text/plain' }),
);
const result = await executeWebFetch(
{ url: 'https://example.com/no-length' },
fakeFetch as unknown as typeof fetch,
);
expect('error' in result && result.error).toBe('body_too_large');
});
it('passes a multi-chunk body that totals just under the cap', async () => {
// Boundary case: MAX_BYTES - 1 bytes split across N chunks. The
// streaming reader's `total > maxBytes` check is strict-greater so
// exactly MAX_BYTES would still succeed; MAX_BYTES + 1 would fail.
// - 1 leaves clear headroom without coinciding with the boundary.
const targetTotal = MAX_BYTES_TEST - 1;
const chunkSize = 256 * 1024; // 256 KiB chunks
const chunks: Uint8Array[] = [];
let remaining = targetTotal;
while (remaining > 0) {
const size = Math.min(chunkSize, remaining);
chunks.push(new Uint8Array(size).fill(67)); // 'C'
remaining -= size;
}
const fakeFetch = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(
streamedResponse(chunks, { contentType: 'text/plain' }),
);
const result = await executeWebFetch(
{ url: 'https://example.com/right-at-cap' },
fakeFetch as unknown as typeof fetch,
);
// The streaming reader succeeded — we got a content shape, not an
// error. (Downstream truncate() will clamp the final string to
// MAX_CHARS_CAP=32000 and set truncated:true; that's the existing
// truncation logic and is exercised by its own test. The point of
// THIS test is that readBodyCapped didn't trip on a body that
// sits just under its byte limit.)
expect('content' in result).toBe(true);
if ('content' in result) {
expect(result.content.length).toBeGreaterThan(0);
// All ASCII 'C's, so the leading 200 chars before any truncation
// marker should be all C — proves we read real bytes through the
// streaming reader rather than getting an empty buffer.
expect(result.content.slice(0, 200)).toBe('C'.repeat(200));
}
});
});

View File

@@ -62,6 +62,39 @@ function stripHtml(html: string): { text: string; title: string | undefined } {
return { text, title };
}
// v1.11.10: streaming body reader. Aborts the response stream the instant
// cumulative bytes cross maxBytes, so a server that lies about
// Content-Length (or omits it entirely) can't make us buffer gigabytes
// before the post-read check fires. reader.cancel() releases the
// underlying connection on the spot.
async function readBodyCapped(
res: Response,
maxBytes: number,
): Promise<{ ok: true; body: string } | { ok: false; bytesRead: number }> {
if (!res.body) return { ok: true, body: '' };
const reader = res.body.getReader();
const chunks: Uint8Array[] = [];
let total = 0;
try {
while (true) {
const { done, value } = await reader.read();
if (done) break;
total += value.byteLength;
if (total > maxBytes) {
// Best-effort cancel — surfaces on the server side as a closed
// connection and (in our tests) fires the ReadableStream's
// cancel() callback so we can assert the abort happened.
await reader.cancel();
return { ok: false, bytesRead: total };
}
chunks.push(value);
}
} finally {
try { reader.releaseLock(); } catch { /* already released by cancel() */ }
}
return { ok: true, body: Buffer.concat(chunks).toString('utf8') };
}
function truncate(text: string, max: number): { content: string; truncated: boolean } {
if (text.length <= max) return { content: text, truncated: false };
const omitted = text.length - max;
@@ -159,19 +192,20 @@ export async function executeWebFetch(
}
}
const contentType = (res.headers.get('content-type') ?? '').toLowerCase();
// Read body. We rely on the 5MB cap by checking length after consumption
// — most malicious or accidental large responses also exceed it via the
// Content-Length pre-flight above. A truly hostile server that lies
// about length AND streams gigabytes would defeat that; the per-hop
// 15s timeout is the secondary fence.
const body = await res.text();
// v1.11.8 review: byte-count, not char-count. A 5MB cap on body.length
// (UTF-16 code units) lets a multi-byte payload (emoji, CJK) pass when
// its wire size already exceeded MAX_BYTES.
const bodyBytes = Buffer.byteLength(body, 'utf8');
if (bodyBytes > MAX_BYTES) {
return { error: 'response_too_large', reason: `body ${bodyBytes} bytes > ${MAX_BYTES}` };
// v1.11.10: stream the body with a hard byte cap. Previously we read
// res.text() in one shot and then byte-length-checked — a server that
// lies about Content-Length (or omits it) could make us buffer
// gigabytes before the post-check fired. readBodyCapped aborts the
// stream the instant total bytes cross MAX_BYTES. The Content-Length
// pre-flight above stays as a cheap early reject for honest servers.
const read = await readBodyCapped(res, MAX_BYTES);
if (!read.ok) {
return {
error: 'body_too_large',
reason: `Response body exceeded ${MAX_BYTES} bytes (read ${read.bytesRead} before abort)`,
};
}
const body = read.body;
let textRaw: string;
let title: string | undefined;